The relationship between parties and their supporters is central to democracy and ideological representation is among the most important of these linkages. We conduct an investigation of party-supporter congruence in Europe with emphasis on the measurement of ideology and focusing on the role of party system polarization, both as a direct factor in explaining congruence and in modifying the eects of voter sophistication. Understanding this relationship depends in part on how the ideology of parties and supporters is measured. We use Poole's Blackbox scaling to derive a measure of latent ideology from voter and expert responses to issue scale questions and compare this to a measure based on left-right perceptions. We then examine how variation in the proximity between party ideological positions and those of their supporters is aected by the polarization of the party system and how this relationship interacts with political sophistication. With the latent ideology measure, we nd that polarization decreases party-supporter congruence but increases the eects of respondent education level on congruence. However, we do not nd these relationships using the left-right perceptual measure. Our ndings underscore important dierences between perceptions of left-right labels and the ideological constraint underlying issue positions.
Introduction
Political parties are the primary vehicles for aggregating voters' interests in elections.
Hence, the ideological linkage between parties and voters is central to the nature of political representation (Powell, 2000; Huber and Powell, 1994; Dalton and Anderson, 2011) .
A core question within this topic is how ideologically close politicians are to their voters. This line of inquiry dates back at least to Miller and Stokes (1963) and produced a long tradition of linking politicians and voters in the US (e.g. Gerber and Lewis 2004; Lewis and Tausanovitch 2015; Clinton 2006) , in Europe (e.g. Klingemann et al. 2017) and beyond (e.g. Saiegh 2015) .
This voter-elite congruence may be distorted by a variety of factors at the individual, party and system levels. This can include voters lacking the knowledge to align with like-minded politicians (Jessee, 2010; Lachat, 2008; Kroh, 2009) or politicians failing to represent those voters (Klingemann et al., 2017; Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Rogers, 2017) . Both these factors being party-supporter incongruence can be aected by party polarizationthe ideological dispersion of parties within the party system (McCarty et al., 2006; Lachat, 2008) . On the one hand, polarization may directly result in parties being dealigned from their supporters (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006) . On the other hand, party polarization provides clarity to party representation by establishing clearer, more distinct reputations to which voters may respond (Levendusky, 2010; Hetherington, 2001 ).
How can we determine the degree of alignment between parties and voters? A key methodological concern in assessing ideological congruence is what constitutes ideology.
As Poole (2005) notes, individuals' views on various policies tend to be related to an underlying tendency, or constraint (Converse, 1964) . These relationships need not be based on substantive relationships among issues but rather may reect a packaging of policies by elites. This underlying ideology can be seen as a psychological space that predicts the response to stimuli, such as roll-call votes or survey questions. These preferences are therefore spatial and, at least for elites, can be relatively low-dimensional (Poole, 2005) .
Because of this, scholars studying mass-elite linkages often assume that ideological positions can be captured by the symbolic concepts of left and right. That is, if individuals are aware of a main underlying dimension of political positions, they can perceive their location and that of political parties on a single conceptual scale. While leftright labels are a spatial analogy, these placements rely on the assumption that individuals compress the relevant policy space into these concepts. Moreover, these labels depend both on voters' capacity to make use of this information (Palfrey and Poole, 1987) and on their subjective notion of how these labels correspond to the ideological information they have about themselves and parties (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Brady, 1985) . In short, voters dier in their use, understanding and denition of these labels.
The distinction between the notion of ideology as a constraint that binds together disparate policy choices versus a scale based on symbolic labels is an important one. The process that maps issues into latent preference space is likely to dier from that which produces self and party perceptions on a symbolic left-right scale (Ansolabehere et al., 2008) . The idea of policy or ideological distance as a latent quality of attitudes or as a symbolic label is therefore important to the concepts of party and voter policy locations.
In turn, this distinction is pertinent to the mechanism behind how party polarization could increase or decrease the distance between parties and voters. Further, it aects how party polarization would inuence the relationship between political sophistication and the assessment of ideological distances.
Here, we examine this measurement distinction in the context of parties' congruence with their voters, how it is aected by party polarization, and how polarization inuences the eect of political sophistication on party-supporter alignment. To place parties and voters on a common scale, we take advantage of the features of the 2014 European Election Study (EES), which includes a set of issue questions corresponding to an expert survey of party positions as well as left-right self and party placements. We apply these measures to the question of whether party polarizationthe overall dispersion of party positions mitigates or exacerbates the ideological gap between parties and their supporters. We use a latent measure based on several issue scales in the EES and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to examine how party polarization aects the ideological gap between party supporters and their preferred parties. We examine rst the direct impact of polarization on the distance between voters and parties in a system and, second, how polarization modies the eect of individual sophistication on party-supporter congruence.
We then compare each of these ndings to a measure based on left-right party and selfperceptions, which also aims to place parties and supporters on a comparable scale.
In the process, this study contributes to our understanding of the importance of measurement when using survey data for research questions on ideology. First, we exploit Keith Poole's Blackbox scaling method (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2016) to integrate voter self-placements with expert party placements on common issues and derive jointly-scaled latent positions. We compare this to an alternative approach based on left-right perception. For this, we make use of Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977) , following Palfrey and Poole (1987) , to put self-and party-left-right placements on a common scale that adjusts for certain forms of perceptual bias.
We argue that the distinction between a latent policy space and a left-right perceptual notion of representation is conceptually important for the study of both ideological congruence and polarization. Moreover, these measures result in dierent observed empirical patterns with regard to the role that polarization plays in distorting such party-supporter alignments and in mediating the eect of political sophistication. In particular, we nd that polarization diminishes congruence while enhancing the importance of sophistication when positions are based on the latent ideology measure. Meanwhile, we observe dierent or even opposite patterns when measuring ideology via the left-right measure. The dierences between the two measures are highly consequential for the meaning of polarization and congruence, and thus for the relationship between these quantities and with political sophistication.
2 Congruence between Politicians and Citizens and Party
Polarization: Literature and Expectations
Since the classic work of Miller and Stokes (1963) on constituency-legislator representation, many studies have empirically examined how parties and politicians represent voters' preferences focusing on the context of congruence between politicians and voters.
In European democracies, a large literature deals with individual party-voter linkages and directly assesses congruence between parties and their voters on a left-right spectrum (Boonen et al., 2017; Klingemann et al., 2017; Thomassen, 2005; Klingemann, 2009; Carlin et al., 2015) . Understanding congruence between parties and their supporters is important not only because it is related to whether parties serve as vehicles for policy representation, but also because it is closely linked to the question of whether voting behavior is based on ideological proximity (Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Adams et al., 2005) . Naturally, an important theme in much of this literature is obtaining comparable estimates of voters' and elites' policy positions (Lewis and Tausanovitch, 2015; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013; Lo et al., 2014) .
The literature on both US and European party representation varies with regard to how polarization inuences representation, suggesting that party polarization can conceivably both distort and enhance party-voter congruence. Several works on the topic of party congruence have emphasized the important role polarization plays in representation. An extensive US literature examines elite polarization in the US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 2011; McCarty et al., 2006) and much has argued there are likely to be a series of distorting eects for representation in general (Lee, 2015; Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Mann and Ornstein, 2013) and for voter-elite congruence in particular (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015; Fiorina and Levendusky, 2006) . Comparative literature also envisions that party polarization could reduce the broader proximity between voters and politicians. Often this is implicit in studies of the origins of polarization (Ezrow, 2008; Dow, 2011; Curini and Hino, 2012) but is also suggested in the related contexts of overall government congruence (Powell, 2011) or proximity voting (PardosPrado and Dinas, 2010) . Following this line of reasoning, we would expect that political polarization will widen the gap between party ideological positions and party supporters' positions.
However, other work on elite-voter alignment in the US, notably Levendusky (2010) and Ensley (2007) , suggests that party polarization can enable voters to better use ideological cues by clarifying party positions. Similarly, in comparative contexts, a number of works suggest that polarization can enhance the ideological nature of voting decisions (Alvarez and Nagler, 2004; Dalton, 2008; Lupu, 2014) and specically that polarization could enhance the clarity of information available to voters (Knutsen and Kumlin, 2005; Carroll and Kubo, 2018) . Along these lines, Lachat (2008) has shown that party polarization tends to increase the degree of ideological voting. If party polarization results in voters with information to vote in a more ideologically consistent way (Levendusky, 2010) , this eect would imply a stronger congruence between parties and supporters. By this reasoning, we would expect that political polarization will reduce the gap between party ideological positions and party supporters' positions.
In any context where voters make choices, behavior is likely to be conditioned on individual characteristics inuencing variation in their ability to obtain and use information.
Chief among these factors in literature on voting and mass opinion is political sophistication, often associated with educational attainment (Luskin, 1987 (Luskin, , 1990 Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Goren, 2004; Gordon and Segura, 1997) . More sophisticated voters may, for example, be better able to identify dierences between parties. A higher level of political sophistication, often measured empirically as education level, should enable voters to better identify the ideological location of party positions when aiming to support proximate parties (Boonen et al., 2017) . In line with this traditional view, we therefore would expect that low levels of education will widen the gap between party ideological positions and party supporters' positions.
The informational eects of polarization depend in part on how party ideological positions serve as shortcuts (Popkin, 1994; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998) . If polarization serves the purpose of clarifying party positions, making it easier for less sophisticated voters to identify party locations, we would expect that party polarization will reduce the importance of political sophistication on party-supporter congruence.
Alternatively, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) indicate that partisanship and ideological labels depend on political sophistication to function as heuristics that enhance voters' decision-making process. If greater separation improves the heuristic functions of party labels, more sophisticated voters may be better able to use them and therefore may exhibit stronger ideological voting (Lachat, 2008) , contributing to greater congruence. Therefore, by this reasoning, we would expect that party polarization will increase the eects of political sophistication on party-supporter congruence.
3 Research Design
Measuring Ideological Linkages between Parties and Voters
To study party-supporter ideological linkages, we must obtain measures allowing us to compare the ideology of parties and their supporters. Many variations exist in how to calculate both polarization and congruence from a given ideology measure (Maoz and Somer-Topcu, 2010; Golder and Ferland, 2017; Andeweg, 2011) . Our concern here is primarily with the measurement of ideology itself, particularly the empirical task of recovering an ideological measure to compare parties and voters.
For our emphasis, we focus on two measures that can capture both voter and party ideology within a party system, and thus can be applied to measure both polarization and congruence.
1 The rst measure attempts to capture the latent ideology derived from issue scales and compare jointly-scaled respondent and party locations. We contrast this with the very dierent notion of ideological location using respondent left-right placements of parties and voters. For left-right placements, we attempt to address the problem of dierences between voters in the perception of these labels.
These two concepts correspond roughly to substantive and symbolic notions of ideology, respectively Stimson, 2009, 2012) . The latent ideology measure is dened as the ideology in terms of the aggregate meaning of attitudes on narrower policy questions, in which voters place themselves and experts place parties on issue scales. This approach has the most in common with measures using elite voting behavior to derive latent ideology (Poole, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) . By contrast, the left-right perceptions measure is dened as how voters perceive party positions and their own locations in an abstract left-right spectrum. We next elaborate on this distinction.
Perceptual Left-Right versus Latent Ideological Positions
The meaning of ideology is ambiguous (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Feldman, 1988) , with many possible conceptualizations and denitions. We focus on two concepts of ideology. First, we consider a symbolic notion of ideology as the perception of the concepts of left and right by voters. Although the meaning of left-right varies across countries, 1 Note that the scope of this paper is limited to measures developed in the work of Keith Poole, and is not therefore intended to addresses the wide array of possible measures for these purposes. This includes those with similar aims based on MP representation (Belchior et al., 2016; Belchior, 2013) , as well as a vast array of other measures that focus on some aspect of either polarization or congruence (e.g. Clark Ferland 2018; Klingemann et al. 2017) voters generally use ideological labels as heuristics to simplify complex political information into a single left-right axis. These types of labels exist across most party systems because they are a useful way to comprehend and organize relationships among parties and the movements of policy (Knutsen, 1998 (Knutsen, , 1995 . Left-right language in political systems reduces the practical complexity of political choices and political communications (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989) and provides a link between parties and voters. While the content will vary widely across political systems (Huber and Inglehart, 1995) , these terms often can absorb a range of substantive conicts as issue cleavages emerge. In surveys, respondents are often asked to locate themselves and parties on the left-right spectrum.
While these perceptions are subjective judgments, a bias-adjusted version of such measures provides an informative basis for a symbolic form of party-supporter linkage (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977) However, the symbols associated with left and right do not necessarily account for the substantive distinctions revealed by policy issues. Concrete policy concepts may give voters a clearer idea of where they stand in operational terms on matters of basic economic and social policies. Political systems tend to aggregate information about party policy positions into a basic underlying policy space. In this way, we can also dene ideology as the latent aggregated information seen across dierences on policy issuesthe constraint that bundles together issues (Poole, 2005) . We can measure overall policy positions by using a scaling approach to identify the latent tendencies exhibited by the issues positions.
In what follows, we describe how measures of the party policy positions and partisans' ideology can be obtained following these left-right perceptual and latent ideology concepts of policy positions.
Measuring Latent Ideology
To capture latent ideology, we take a joint scaling approach to link measures of party locations on issue scales (here, placed by experts) and voter responses on equivalent issues.
Related approaches have been fruitful in numerous settings (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014; Lewis and Tausanovitch, 2015) . Here we analyze mass survey data from EES and an expert survey data from CHES to recover a common policy space between voters and parties. There are unique advantages of EES 2014 and CHES 2014 for this purpose. Both of these questionnaires are organized to be consistent across nations and, most importantly for current purposes, there are questions included in each that are designed to be comparable between EES voters' responses and CHES experts'
judgements. The approach we take here uncovers the basic space underlying this set of policy issues.
We unite the expert and voter responses on seven EES questions: economic intervention, redistribution, government spending, civil liberties, immigration, EU integration and environment issues to recover a common policy space.
2
We use Poole's Blackbox scaling technique to uncover the basic policy space contained within the issue scales of elite survey data (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2013; Armstrong et al., 2014; Poole et al., 2016) . Poole (1998) developed the Blackbox scaling procedure specically to directly estimate ideal points on the main latent dimensions of variance present in a series of issues scale questions. Furthermore, by applying this method to the policy issues that are shared across the two surveys, we can recover a common ideological space among the respondentsin this case, the parties and voters within the survey.
We recover all of the individual voters' and parties' (the expert judgments) ideal points by reducing survey data matrix to its basic dimensions. We decompose the original survey 2 See the Tables 3 and 4 in the Appendix for details. Although eight issues are recorded in each survey, a general question on lifestyle issues in the CHES lacks a suciently similar corresponding question within the EES, which refers to the specic matter of same-sex marriage. We otherwise erred on the side of including the remaining 11-point scale issue questions, but due to a relatively weak comparability between the EES EU control and CHES Nationalism questions, we instead use a rescaled version of the CHES 7-point EU Position variable because of its greater similarity to the EES question. However, we found similar results to those presented here when using the CHES Nationalism question. More generally, we note that choosing among various subsets of questions would certainly produce a variety of dierent results and these sensitivities are an area for future research. See the Appendix for a discussion of the face validity of the estimates. data matrix on the seven issues to derive the ideal points. As described by Poole (1998) by each respondent concerning the left-right concept (Brady, 1985 (Brady, , 1989 . For example, extreme voters may place themselves closer to the center, while placing most parties to one side. We follow Palfrey and Poole (1987) and use Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977) , which is designed to recover a common scale of voters and parties within given survey that accounts to some extent for the DIF bias in left-right place- '0' means "left" and '10' means "right" best describes this party? (Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Armstrong et al., 2014; Poole et al., 2016) . Correcting for bias using these parameters results in estimates for both stimuli locations (parties) and respondents (voters) that can be compared within each survey.
4 Note that below we use the MLE implementation of Aldrich-McKelvey scaling described by Poole et al. (2016) . While this results in losing observations from respondents with some missing stimuli responses, it has an advantage for current purposes in that it requires no assumptions about the location of the estimated stimuli locations (cf. Hare et al. 2015 ), which we rely on for both the congruence and polarization measures. Although we retain these observations in the sample presented below using the latent ideology measure, we nd similar results on key variables for that analysis when the sample is restricted to those without missing values on the left-right perceptual measure. Note that we also remove 14 additional observations that produce extreme values outside of the proper range of the AldrichMcKelvey estimates.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is the distance between parties and supporters 5 on each of the measures described above. To view this distance more closely between the two measures, we isolate the specic example of the Netherlands. given that the left-right measure is derived from voter's own perceptions, rather than expert placements.
6
Since our concern in this study is the relationship between parties and voters, we calculate the absolute value of the ideological dierence between the above-estimated party positions and the median ideology of party supportersdened as the party for which the respondent reports being closest to. We consider this value as the ideological representation gap between parties, where smaller values represent a closer alignment between parties and supporters. Thus, higher values in the analysis below imply less party-supporter congruence. We calculate the value of the ideological gap between parties and supporters for parties in the 28 countries in EES 2014.
7 Since the results of this absolute value calculation are highly skewed, we transform this quantity by taking the square root and use a linear model below on the resulting variable.
We standardize the range of the left-right perceptual measure by subtracting the coun-5 The the parties associated with supporters are based on EES question pp21, which readsDo you consider yourself to be close to any particular political party?
6 Indeed many of the dierences in the ndings presented here are also likely to be directly related to the use of perceived versus expert positions for party locations between the measures.
7 The total number of respondents with information on party support is 15,341, 1,771 of which are unable to produce measures on either dependent variable due to missing data on issue or party placements.
We also remove parties that have less than 5 usable supporter observations in the survey.(Neuman, 1986; Luskin, 1987 Luskin, , 1990 Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Mondak, 1999; Goren, 2004; Highton, 2009 ). We make a binary variable for education level, which is designed to standardize and simplify the education measure across cases. This binary variable represents`high' and`low' education within each country-year, with those who are equal or greater than the country median education level coded as 1, and others coded 0.
We also control for the party location on the measure in question due to the possibility that party-supporter linkages may dier systematically between parties with left and right positions. Similarly, we include the location of the respondent on the same measure to control for any dierences between voters on the left and right. Finally, we control for the vote share of the respondent's supported party, as reported in the CHES data.
Results
We use a multi-level linear model with country-level and party-level random eects. Table   1 shows the results of multi-level regression analysis for the latent variable measure. The results of the analysis using the left-right perceptual measure are shown in Table 2 . In each table, we examine the individual-level education level variable, Education, as well as the individual-, party-and country-level control variables described above. In the second model for each dependent variable, we include the interaction between country-level party polarization and the respondent's education level.
With regard to the latent ideology measure, party polarization increases the distance between voters and parties. Predicted values from the rst model in Table 1 This is illustrated in the plot on the left side of Figure 3 , which shows that the reductive eect of education is present only at higher levels of polarization. In sum, the results from the latent ideology measure indicate that when parties are more dispersed on the main latent dimension of ideology, this comes at the expense of congruence and increases the disparities between less and more sophisticated voters. These results are consistent with arguments suggesting that more sophisticated voters are advantaged in more polarized environments.
With the left-right perceptual measure, shown in Table 2 , we again nd that education level reduces party-supporter distances as we would expect. However, we nd a very dierent pattern with regard to other variables. When the left-right perceptual measure is used, party polarization appears to be related to stronger party-supporter congruence.
The predicted values of this eect are as shown in the plot on the right side of That is, such data is typically interpreted as capturing the most important dierences in spatial locations. In this study, we recover a latent common ideological space for European voters and parties from voter and expert issue responses using Poole's Blackbox scaling (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2016) . This latent ideology measure enables us to examine correlates of distances between voters and parties. We contrast this with a measure derived from respondents' left-right self and party placements. For the left-right perceptual measure, we use Aldrich-McKelvey scaling (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Palfrey and Poole, 1987) to adjust for bias in these placement data. While this study conducts only a limited analysis of possible variants in measurement, 9 our results indicate that the relationship between party polarization and party-supporter congruence is sensitive to the measurement of ideology, as is how polarization interacts with political sophistication. The direct eects of polarization and interactive eects we nd for education when using our latent ideology measure are not present when using the perceptual left-right measure. Such disparate ndings suggest that these seemingly similar but fundamentally dierent notions of ideology have a substantial impact on the conclusions we can draw regarding concepts of party polarization and party-supporter 9 A variety of further combinations we do not explore here would certainly yield even more variation in results such as this. We also avoid important and widely-discussed questions of how congruence and polarization should be calculated when using any underlying measure of ideological positions.
distances.
In particular, we note that the latent ideology approach based on issue scales provides a useful measure for understanding representation that has much in common conceptually with the measures of elite locations used in other elite studies that reect the ideological constraint revealed across multiple stimuli responses (Poole, 2005; Carroll and Poole, 2014) . Our ndings also have a bearing more generally on how we should interpret measures based on left-right placements.
Our results are limited only to a single survey and a comparison of just two measures. However, they suggest the need for more research into the importance of measurement in studies of ideological positions in party politics. To the extent latent policy space is of interest to future work on this topic, it will be important to establish more common issue questions between surveys of mass and elite preferences.
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